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Abstract
Decision making is a complex process and it is particularly challenging to make decisions with, or for, patients who
are near the end of their life. Some of those challenges will not be resolved - due to our human inability to fore-
see the future precisely and the human proclivity to change stated preferences when faced with reality. Other
challenges of the decision-making process are manageable. This commentary offers a set of approaches which
may lead to progress in this field.
One clearly desirable approach can and should be used more often than it is: the routine inclusion of discussions about
the goals of care and documentation with all patients who have a poor prognosis. The match between a patient’s
goals and the care received should be the gold standard for quality palliative care.
Planning for future situations is necessary but hard. In order to achieve efficient elicitation and documentation of
advance care planning, research is needed on each individual’s thresholds for transitioning from curative to
palliative intent and on the trajectory of changed preferences when illness occurs. Another clearly desirable approach
is the documentation and use of community preferences, so that proxies making decisions without guidance from
the patient can at least know what the majority of people considering similar situations chose to do.
Part of the challenge of achieving ‘quality dying’ may have to do with the still current (mainly Western) tendency
to a death-denying culture and the inability of dying people to enter into the dying role. Awareness of the tasks of
the dying role and the provision of time and space for those tasks during the delivery of medical care is essential.
Medicine needs to continue to enhance the existential maturity of our profession, our patients and the cultures in
which we practice. This state of mind should provide for decisions made with a more settled acceptance of
mortality and with more awareness of the necessary connection to our survivors and next generation that mortal-
ity creates. Specific interventions, such as Dignity Therapy and advance care planning, may aid this state of mind.
Introduction
Decision theory has become a specialized topic of inter-
est and study within several disciplines: in medicine,
decision theory draws on economics (especially game
theory), moral philosophy, psychology, sociology and the
law. The roots of decision-making are eternal and so
critical that Greek mythology used it as a key theme.
For instance, planning in advance to manage his own
anticipated feelings Odysseus had himself tied to the
mast to help him resist the Sirens [1]. Indeed, even
further back in our evolutionary history, the effective
execution of decision-making by individuals must have
been quite refined, as many decisions directly determine
immediate and long-term survival. Theorists and
researchers who model and measure decision-making
should not expect this to be an easy task. Human equip-
ment for decision-making stems from multiple levels of
consciousness: intuitive, driven by subconscious pro-
cesses; gut level, driven by adrenal hormones; cognitive
and uniquely rational; and cognitive but socially influ-
enced in complex ways. Further, decisions are made and
reviewed prospectively, in real time and in retrospect.
Each of these features is not only complex but some-
what plastic and humanly fallible. Not only does deci-
sion-making have ancient roots, it also seems to
represent something critical about human nature and
human dignity: it is the central manifestation of auton-
omy and respect for a person’s decision is often under-
stood to be the equivalent of respect for that person as
a whole.
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eral features. First, decisions are changeable. One strik-
ing example is that of women who decline pain
management before giving birth but beg for it during
labour underscores the reality [2]. Second, decisions are
malleable, being influenced by others. Indeed the influ-
ence of the clinician on decisions is so critical that it
defines the type of relationship models that exist in
medicine [3]. In the framework of models, the relation-
ships are variously informative, interpretive, deliberative
or paternalistic, depending on whether decisions are
uninfluenced, interpreted to fit the patient, deliberative
to include advice or imposed from a position of superior
knowledge. Third, illness-care decisions are often
required at a time when the decision-making capacity of
the patient is hampered, marginal or non-existent.
Much has been written about the two main alternative
methods for honouring a patient’sw i s h e si nt h el a s t
type of situation: that is, to elicit and honour prospec-
tive decisions as directly as possible or to designate a
proxy who makes substituted or best-interests judg-
ments. Many more fall into the greyer zones of ham-
pered or marginal decision-making. For instance, a
person recently diagnosed cancer has to make decisions
i nas h o r tt i m ef r a m ew h e nh eo rs h eh a sn o th a dt i m e
to adjust to the significance of the diagnosis and is
flooded with feelings that may blunt cognitive proces-
sing [4]. Others have illnesses, such as dementia, meta-
bolic imbalances, brain tumours or strokes that limit
one or more aspects of, or globally limit but do not
eliminate, their decision-making capacity.
Decision-making near the end of life is particularly
challenging. That should not be surprising: all the
Achilles heels’ of decision-making are particularly rele-
vant near the end of life. Subconscious processes have a
lot to say about death and dying: hormonal functions
may be off due to illness; cognitive processes may also
be off due to illness; the social setting is complex and
powerful; people change their minds, perhaps more than
ever before; and those expected to survive the patient
may worry about decision-regret. However, decisions
must be made.
Importantly, decision-making near the end of life also
has unique features that need to be accommodated - by
and with or for a person who probably has little experi-
ence of such a situation. When facing death, people
make decisions about how to transition out of life that
may be analogous to prior decisions (such as leaving a
job or a country) or similar to decisions made by those
they have seen die before them, but are usually unprece-
dented for the individual. As more than one dying
patient has said: ‘Id o n ’tk n o ww h a tt od o ;I ’ve never
died before’. At the same time, the unique features of
dying are of great importance - from creating last
memories, to ‘showing my grandson how a real man
dies with dignity’ or making provisions for surviving
loved ones - and decision-making needs to allow for
these important features. Most of these needs transcend
cultures and yet modern Western medicine has only
just begun to offer suggestions for guidance [5-7].
Sadly, instead of recognizing that optimal decision-
making at the end of life will always be different than
optimal decision-making in other areas, some commen-
tators have declared the area hopeless. More than one
commentator has stated that advance care planning (the
process of making prospective decisions) does not work
because people change their minds and, anyway, they
get over-ruled [8]. Indeed, it is true that problems
abound. Some are inherent and relatively intractable but
no better alternatives to advance planning exist. For
example, anticipating future wishes is always going to be
limited and yet people usually want to honour that form
of autonomy as much as possible. Other problems are
manageable. For instance, many people complete what
advance care planning they do with a lawyer rather than
their clinical team and some do not even tell their desig-
nated proxy of his or her selection for the role [9]. Pol-
icy, culture and education could remedy that situation.
Overall, in the view of at least some, declarations of
desuetude or uselessness are counterproductive when
there is so little alternative and so much to do - which
include defining and developing measures of what suc-
cessful decision-making near the end of life is.
This commentary sets out six suggested directions for
decision-making in this last and all important phase of
every person’s life. Finally, we bring these perspectives
together in the form of an agenda for progress.
Discussion
Goals
There was a ‘big thought’ in the movement that was
started by Louis Kutner in 1969 that it was necessary to
protect patients’ wishes for care near the end of life
under the law through the vehicle of advance care plan-
ning. However, this was mostly obscured through the
1970s and 1980s by the focus on forms and statutes,
skirmishes about whether proxy designation or written
directives should be the primary vehicle for advance
care planning and by turf wars about whether doctors
or lawyers should be guiding (and billing for) the pro-
cess. In the 1990s the Patient Self Determination Act
was passed but research was underway that mired the
progress with questions that were, in retrospect, poorly
framed and a misguided interpretation of the findings.
Modest use rates, significant change rates among
choices, challenges related to the number of possible
decisions patients might have to consider that might
become relevant in the future and the high rate of
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plans discouraged many people [8]. Instead of recogniz-
ing these as either inherent or manageable problems
that were less bad than the original situation, the move-
ment stumbled.
In the meantime, the lost ‘big thought’ was simple and
not even particularly origin a l ,b u ti tw a sp o w e r f u la n d
necessary. It was the notion that patients have their own
goals for care. Since those goals do not always match
the goals that had taken root in medicine - to cure ill-
ness, stamp out disease and save lives - it was also
sorely needed. Patients were asking for more respect.
Physicians, some of whom were startled, sometimes pro-
tested that these decisions were too complicated for
untrained people to take. However, patients are real
humans, real mortals and endowed with enough ability
to have managed to get through life until that point
(and their genes had survived the harshest of times on
earth during the evolution of eras – ap o i n tw h i c h
should be justification for clinicians to respect the
patients’ abilities). At least a substantial portion of
patients understood human mortality and knew that
medical interventions would one day not save them
from death. This portion of patients often had different
goals for care when illness arrived which had a poor
prognosis. Often more than one type of goal existed in
the same person at the same time. A review of the
research literature identified at least six goals for pallia-
tive care patients: (1) to be cured; (2) to live longer; (3)
to improve or maintain function/quality of life/indepen-
d e n c e ;( 4 )t ob ec o m f o r t a b l e ;( 5 )t oa c h i e v el i f eg o a l s ;
and (6) to provide support for the family/caregiver [10].
Research had already demonstrated that goals predict
specific treatment preferences reasonably accurately
[11]. The use of goals of care seemed to be the perfect
solution - and it may well still be just that. In a real
sense, adherence to the patient’s goal for care should
d e f i n ea n db et h eg o l d - s t a n d a r dm e a s u r eo fq u a l i t yo f
care near the end of life.
A body of work is beginning which could provide
measures for quality care and quality of life in the ser-
iously ill and end-of-life population. Screening instru-
ments [12], intake evaluation instruments [13] and
outcome measures [14] are all being developed in an
effort to eliminate the previously mistaken assumption
that life and functional ability is valued near life’s end in
the same way as it is during health and during chronic
conditions. These developments are all to the good.
Although some incorporate it, to this reviewer’s knowl-
edge, as yet no validated instrument measures the sim-
ple outcome of matching care to goals. This may partly
be due to the lack of routine documentation of goals of
care so that evaluations rely on personal report. How-
ever, if the patient’s prime goal among a valid set of
goal options (such as the above, with room for indivi-
dualization) were by policy routinely documented and
updated, then it would be easy to develop a method of
measuring goal match.
Although there is still a frustratingly large gap
between optimal and actual practice, an increasing num-
ber of clinicians do now routinely ask their patients
about their goals for care and organize their care plans
around the patient’s priority goals. In order to ensure
the translation of goals for care into physician orders
that can travel with the patient from one care site to
another, many are now using POLST (Physicians Orders
for Life-Sustaining Treatment) or MOLST (Medical
Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment) forms or their
equivalents.
Thresholds
A critical limitation of the use of goals of care near the
end of life is that goals change as the illness changes.
Therefore, near the end of life, those new situations
often entail a loss of decision-making capacity. So how
can goals of care made in real time be useful in plan-
ning for future, different, illness situations?
The provision of scenarios to consider and the identi-
fication of goals for each scenario is one approach [15].
Then, with the strong predictive capacity of goals for
treatment selection, the physician and the family will
have a reasonably reliable guide based on the anticipa-
tory decisions of the patient. Those who want to go
further by illustrating and validating their goal choices
by considering specific interventions can do so. If this
additional step is taken, then, in order to allow for reali-
ties that cannot be anticipated, the selections should be
considered as illustrative rather than binding unless the
patient demands highly controlled directives. Given the
uncertainty of future medical events, some researchers
have found it useful to explicitly determine how much
latitude the patient desires the surrogate decision maker
to have when interpreting the directive in light of an
unfolding clinical scenario [16].
However, articulation and recording in medical
records and elsewhere of goals in various scenarios is
potentially too cumbersome. So much of medicine is
able to characterize an entity by a single number on a
scale. Can such a simple descriptor be found in advance
care planning?
One possibility is to identify the individual’st h r e s h o l d
for switching from one type of goal to another. Usually
the switch of most relevance is from curative intent to
palliative intent. Preliminary work from an ambulatory
care clinic population suggests that the majority of peo-
ple considering their goals and treatment choices among
a series of increasingly dire illness situations showed a
clear threshold for that switch between curative and
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time. Another study conducted in a nursing home popu-
lation found that, for many people, the level of cognition
is a key driver in defining a satisfactory quality of life
and becomes an important factor for future decisions
about whether to pursue further life-prolonging inter-
ventions [17].
Reasonable hope exists that a scale could be con-
structed on which peoples’ thresholds could be codified
in a concise, universal code. Such a scale could be based
on illness severity - perhaps a simple ordinal scale or a
compound one with several factors such as disability
(incorporating cognitive components) - prognosis and
treatment burden. For instance, a patient could be char-
acterized as D9, P9, T3 meaning disability on a scale of
0-10 will be tolerated to a high level before palliative
care is preferred. A poor prognosis needs to be very
poor (9 on a 0-10 scale) before palliation becomes the
primary goal and treatment burden is tolerable up to 3
on a 0-10 scale before palliation becomes paramount.
Another patient who values function more, and is better
prepared for death when the time comes, might be char-
acterized, after answering validated questions as D3, P4,
T3, and so on. The resulting scale could be used to
guide decisions about specific medical interventions
when an individual has reached a level of disability and
prognosis deemed unsatisfactory.
Two axes of evolving value
However, stability of preferences over time while in rea-
sonable health is quite different from stability in the
face of acute illness. Suffering drives people to do things
they would not have expected and it also drives their
loved ones to sink their resources into alleviating the
suffering. Preferences, like those of Odysseus and
women in labour, change. Presumably, that is true of
goals, thresholds and specific preferences, although data
on that point are limited.
Since 1993 when James Lubitz described the exponen-
tial rise in costs of care as the last year of life progresses
[18], people have tried to understand who or what is
driving the choices. Ultimately, most acknowledge that
policy, culture and everyone involved has a hand in driv-
ing the high utilization of care near the end of life.
However, the common assumption has been that this
pattern is irrational. Why would anyone spend increas-
ing amounts on diminishing returns?
Only recently have some commentators pointed out
that another rational explanation could be involved.
That is: the less life a person has, the more it is valued
[19]. Further, the less time there is to spend what
resources are available, the more it makes sense to
spend whatever resources exist - unless the survivors
and the next generation are being considered. For many
people in the throes of suffering, altruism is harder to
find. Instead the carers take on the altruistic roles and,
often the resources that go beyond those of the patient
also become exhausted.
People may fall into two broad categories: those for
whom the increasing threat to life prompts ever more
earnest attempts to hold on to it; and those for whom it
prompts a letting go and a passing on of what they can
to others. Research is sorely needed into this area. If
these groups exist, can patients determine which group
they are in? Could such identification help predict the
trajectory of change, if any, of their wishes?
Until such time as research on these questions allows
for a guided estimation from anticipatory choices, at
least clinicians should counsel patients and their families
that many people do change their preferences in the
face of illness experience and that their inclination can
go in either direction. As people do their advance care
planning, they can take that reality into account in tell-
ing their proxy how much to allow for that type of
change.
Community standards
For those - and there will always be some - who have
not engaged in discussions about goals, thresholds or
any kind of care choices, there is still a helpful guiding
standard. Indeed, the approach could also be helpful for
those with their own directive. Studies can generate
population-wide, scenario-based preferences. Then,
when someone from a similar population is ill and no
longer capable of decision-making, and a life-sustaining
intervention choice hangs in the balance, it would at
least possible to see that x% of people considering a
similar situation would have chosen Y. It is similar in
concept to the legal ‘reasonable person’ standard in
which a judgment call is made about what a substitute
imagined person would do; in this case the imagined
person is an average population or a community mem-
ber. This can be comforting to, and appreciated by,
family and other decision-makers who are burdened by
the decisions and the lack of any guidance from the
patient’s prior wishes [20].
Roles
Many clinicians have been reminded, correctly so, to
screen for depression and not to make the mistake of
considering depression as ‘normal’ among the seriously
ill. However, clinicians also have the experience of find-
ing that people who are dying can be withdrawn and dis-
affected without meeting the criteria for depression.
Psychiatrists and bereavement specialists from a range of
disciplines know that dying does not have to be depres-
sing even though loss is sad. It can trigger depression,
but that is not the same thing. Chochinov’s findings from
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nomenon. This legacy-making intervention produces
such extraordinary satisfaction and appreciation that he
terms it the penicillin of palliative care, though it has
minimal or no impact on depression or anxiety [21]. Per-
haps interventions that the terminally ill and their
families appreciate do not necessarily lift depression even
when it does exist. Something else is going on.
A plausible explanation is premised on the perspective
that society and modern medicine has lost track of the
importance of the dying role [22]. Patients may find
themselves tethered to their bed by intravenous tubing,
medical routines and the isolation of medical institu-
tions, unable to fulfill the tasks of a dying role. Perhaps
what is happening to these people is that because they
lack a job or role and they feel worthless or become fru-
strated and then withdraw because they feel unable to
c o m p l e t et h e i rf i n a lt a s k sw i t ht h o s et h e yl o v e .W h e n
Chochinov and his colleagues offer Dignity Therapy,
what may be happening is that they are essentially
releasing the tethers and inviting people into their last
and most important role by offering to make a legacy
document from their life narrative to pass on to their
loved ones. The success of the activity may have to do
with patients having successfully engaged in some of the
tasks of their life-cycle appropriate (dying) role. Tasks of
the dying role include: offering loved ones a blessing;
passing on life wisdoms; sharing lasting memories
through stories or small treasures or cooking recipes;
settling relationships; and saying goodbye. Many of
these tasks are directly or indirectly accomplished by
the Dignity Therapy document that patients produce.
Social scientists guard the designation of roles care-
fully: criteria must be met before it can be considered a
real role. Some doubt that there is such a thing as a
dying role and consider that the sick role encompasses
all the roles that occur around death. However, the
dying role is different from the sick role, in which the
person is to receive care in order to get better. Indeed,
if the dying role is never entered, it may explain some
of the extremes of spending near the end of life and
perhaps that lack of entry into the dying role reflects
the death-denying nature of present-day culture. The
dying role has a life cycle stage: it has jobs or tasks; it
guides people in situations where they are unsure what
to do; and it involves specific relationships between peo-
ple (the dying and the survivors). The dying role is best
understood as being one of life’s most important roles.
People care deeply about their ability to enter essential
life roles: for instance, a person who wants to be a
mother or a father but is unable to suffers a fate that
some would consider among the worst possible. Simi-
larly, a person who cannot be the leader or the teacher
o rt h ea r t i s ts h e / h ef e l td r a w nt ob es u f f e r sd e e p l y .I ti s
reasonable to understand the disaffection and withdra-
wal of the dying as an expression of a similar kind of
suffering: the suffering of role denial. The suffering also
accrues to the bereaved. If the deceased was not able,
due to a lack of guidance or opportunity, to give his or
her blessing, pass on those family recipes, make a mean-
ingful gift or make peace and pass on roles, the people
who would have received those things now lack some-
thing important. Often, even among those who have lost
a loved one many years ago, when they reflect on this
a n dr e a l i z et h e yd i dn o tr e c e i v eo n eo ft h o s ei n t a n g i b l e ,
precious things, they are moved to tears.
What has this to do with clinicians and our care of
the dying? Perhaps the world of medicine does not have
a strong obligation to foster the dying role but it does
have a strong obligation to allow for it. To impede it
should be seen as an unwanted and serious side-effect
of treatment. To impede it constitutes a prevention of a
major source of comfort and meaning for patients and
their families. Uncertainty about prognosis may pose a
barrier to a smooth transition to the dying role. As was
described a decade ago, many chronically ill individuals
do not have a clear understanding that they are dying
until the very end - in part, perhaps, because the physi-
cians are not able to provide accurate prognostic infor-
mation [23]. Similarly, physicians caring for dying
nursing home residents describe the uncertainty of
knowing when the patient is unlikely to benefit from
further curative medical interventions [24].
One option is to improve prognostication [25]. How-
ever, clarity about when dying begins is less important
than planning and preparing for death even if it may be
far away. Engaging some of the tasks of the dying role
can occur during youth and the years of good health.
Clinicians can foster this by being comfortable with dis-
c u s s i n gt h es i g n i f i c a n c eo ft h ed y i n gr o l ew i t ha l l
patients and noting that it is not just for those with a
poor prognosis. Whether the prognosis is days to weeks
or months to years, care plans need to allow for some
of the dying role tasks to be accomplished, by making
space and time for visitors, for trips and shared plea-
sures and for interventions such as Dignity Therapy, as
much as possible and as much as the patient wants. The
success of a recent pilot project to move palliative care
upstream - to allow palliative care to be provided along-
side restorative care while demonstrating overall
decreased utilization of health resources [26] - supports
the possibility that some of the tasks of the dying role
may be facilitated long before imminent death.
Existential maturity: a Holy Grail or nature’s basic
wisdom?
Clinicians and poets watch people die and both describe
how some slide ‘gently into the night’ and others instead
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of living, some of this is probably due to pathophysiol-
ogy - perhaps something to do with the state of inhibi-
tory impulses in the central nervous system during the
last hours of life [28]. However, some of it seems to
antedate the last hours. Although almost surely everyone
possesses a component of fighting and acceptance, it
still seems that there is a general dichotomy.
Clinicians sometimes also observe that a character
type seems to exist. People with this character type live
their lives with a peaceful sense that every day can be
enjoyed as it if were their last, they seem to live with lit-
tle sense of fear and seem to die relatively peacefully.
T h e s es a m ep e o p l em a yb et h eo n e sw h os e l e c th o s p i c e
care goals more often than curative treatment goals and
they may expend less in direct care costs.
I si tp o s s i b l et h a ts u c hp e o p l eh a v ea c h i e v e da ne x i s -
tential maturity - a kind of peaceful acceptance of mor-
tality and of the relationship between generations of life
that mitigates the pain of our transience by allowing an
understanding of how we can die without entirely ceas-
ing to exist? Is it possible that this feature predicts end-
of-life decision-making in ways that could be useful in
medical care planning? Could a scale to measure such
be developed?
Dylan Thomas adjured the subject of his poem [27]
not to go gently into the night - likewise palliative care
specialists have supported the need of some to fight for
life until the last possibility has passed. It is not clear
that existential maturity, in contrast to this impulse, is
normative as long as life is possible. It is also clear that
it can be a good and healthy thing. Most religious tradi-
tions have rituals of prayer for the ill and most have
prayers that can be interpreted in such a way that, at
some point, prayer for healing can be synonymous with
prayer for a comfortable, natural death.
If existential maturity is a good thing for some, and if
the enactment of the dying role is a good thing for both
those who are dying and the bereaved, it is tempting to
wonder if it could be fostered. It seems possible that
enactment of tasks from the dying role foster existential
maturity. Perhaps the acts of advance care planning and
making a legacy document - whether it is a product of
Dignity Therapy or a more home spun ethical will - fos-
ter existential maturity. Should medicine promote such
enactments and, if so, to whom should they be
addressed? Some high schools encourage students to
write their epitaph as a way of helping them to gain a
perspective of what matters in life. Perhaps such activ-
ities are fitting at every life stage, whether a person
chooses the quiet or the tumultuous path to complete
t h e i rl i f es t o r y .W ed on o tk n o wt h ea n s w e rt ot h i s :
research is sorely needed because these are very impor-
tant matters.
In surveys of seriously ill patients and their family
members it has been found that this is what they want.
Medicine has, quite rightly, concerned itself with cure.
However, few people will pass along the road to death
without passing through the hands of medical profes-
sionals. These medical professionals must, therefore,
understand these issues and ensure that the systems of
care accommodate their needs.
An agenda for progress
Palliative care researchers need to provide us with a few
conceptual advances and a few good tools to enable us
to experience as good a death as possible. We need a
better understanding of:
￿ thresholds that we require when we switch from
curative to palliative intent and how these decision-
drivers can be used to aide us
￿ our trajectory for changing the value that we place
on preserving life as the remaining amount
diminishes and how this decision-driver can be used
to help us
￿ different communities’ preferences for end of life
care
￿ how the concept of the dying role can help relieve
suffering and how to foster it without trying to
impose it
￿ the concept of existential maturity.
We also need validated measures of:
￿ quality dying that provide at least a subscale or an
independent scale which can help to match that care
with the intended goals
￿ existential maturity.
Some of what is need is not research but the imple-
mentation of known good practices. Dissemination and
implementation methods have recently received
increased attention as the medical world has begun to
realize that good things do not always disseminate effec-
tively or get taken up in practice merely as a result of
publication and presentation in continuing education set-
tings. The palliative care discipline has played a leading
role in the use of methods that are effective in dissemina-
tion, including through the use of quality improvement
methods. More efforts are needed to close the gaps in:
￿ the widespread routine elicitation and use of
patient goals of care among clinicians
￿ the use of effective advance care planning
conversations
￿ the use of community preferences for patients for
whom there is no evidence of any prior wishes.
Emanuel and Scandrett BMC Medicine 2010, 8:57
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/8/57
Page 6 of 8Conclusions
In society in general, in medicine more specifically and
among individuals, much progress has been made toward
the necessary level of maturity and responsible living to
enable an acceptance of our mortality. However, there is
still much to be done and medicine must continue to
play a leading role. Through research, medicine will iden-
tify and add to the understanding of the range of whole-
some paths to death and devise a way of evaluating those
paths and those on them. Through training and imple-
mentation, medicine will improve the journey. It is the
core of medical care, a central part of the mandate from
society and our forbearers in medicine, to relieve suffer-
ing and optimize well-being in every part of the life cycle.
T h el a s tp h a s ei nap e r s o n ’sl i f ec y c l eb r i n g sah i g h
chance of suffering and of lost critical opportunities: it
can also offer the potential for important gratification
and realized opportunities. As the majority of people
complete this life cycle whilst in our care, the role of
medicine is critical. In order to discharge our role-
mandate to optimize care near the end of life, including
fostering the best decisions each individual can make,
medical profession must continue to undertake research
and training to improve practices. We should be:
￿ routinely integrating goals of care discussions and
documentation into our care practices
￿ evaluating whether personal thresholds can be used
for tailored, effective advance planning
￿ learning more about peoples’ evolving values in the
face of illness
￿ using community standards as a reasonable guide
in the absence of other information
￿ fostering entry into the dying role for people who
have a poor prognosis
￿ instituting research into existential maturity.
We have come far but we still have a long way to go.
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